Happy leap day! An extra day in the year, which is more than many US pharmacies have had this past week. ๐
On 21 February Change Healthcare, part of UnitedHealth Group, disclosed a cyberattack that forced it to take systems offline. The ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware group has claimed responsibility. Most people outside the industry had never heard of Change Healthcare. Inside the US health system it’s everywhere. It processes around 15 billion healthcare transactions a year: eligibility checks, prior authorisations, claims, payments and prescriptions. The American Hospital Association says it touches around one in every three patient records.
A week later, pharmacies are struggling to process insurance claims, providers can’t get paid, and smaller practices are watching their cash run down.
The Lesson Isn’t New, but It Is Bigger
We talk a lot about concentration risk in cloud and in critical suppliers. This is what it looks like when it actually happens. One intermediary goes down, and thousands of organisations that never had a security incident of their own are suddenly unable to operate.
Some questions worth asking of your own organisation:
- Which third parties, if they went dark for two weeks, would stop us operating? Not inconvenience us. Stop us.
- What’s the manual fallback, and has anyone practised it recently? Paper processes work far better when someone has used them before.
- How long can we last financially if a supplier outage stops revenue but not costs?
- Do our contracts and our incident plans agree on who notifies whom, and when?
These are resilience questions, not just security questions. Business continuity, security and operations need to answer them together.
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Postscript: A March AHA survey found that 74% of hospitals reported a direct impact on patient care and 94% a financial impact. UnitedHealth put its direct costs at $827 million by mid-April, and later estimated the total at well over a billion dollars.
