Security

The Keys We Hand Out

This one has been growing all week.

Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant reported that between 8 and 18 August, a threat actor tracked as UNC6395 used stolen OAuth and refresh tokens belonging to the Salesloft Drift chat integration to access customers’ Salesforce instances and export large volumes of data. On 20 August, Salesloft and Salesforce revoked the tokens and Drift was pulled from the Salesforce AppExchange.

Yesterday, 28 August, GTIG widened the scope: tokens for the “Drift Email” integration had also been compromised and used to read email in a small number of Google Workspace accounts. The advice now is to treat every token connected to Drift as compromised.

What They Were After

The interesting part is what the attackers were looking for. GTIG says they searched the stolen data for credentials: AWS access keys, passwords, Snowflake tokens. In other words, the secrets people paste into support cases and CRM notes while trying to fix something quickly.

The Keys We Hand Out

Every time someone clicks “Allow” on a SaaS integration, we hand out a key. Those keys:

  • often have broad scopes (“read all data”),
  • don’t expire unless someone revokes them,
  • sit in someone else’s infrastructure, and
  • rarely appear in anyone’s risk register.

What I’d do this week, whether or not you use Drift:

  1. Inventory your connected apps and OAuth grants in Salesforce, Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, GitHub and Slack. Remove the ones nobody can explain.
  2. Reduce scopes and add IP restrictions where the platform supports them.
  3. Search your tickets and CRM records for secrets. Rotate anything you find, and give people a safe way to share credentials, so they stop pasting them into cases.
  4. Monitor for bulk exports and unusual API patterns from integration users.

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