Two weeks after Stryker, here’s a reminder that the security tools themselves can be the way in.
On 19 March, attackers tracked as TeamPCP published a malicious Trivy v0.69.4 release and poisoned version tags of the official trivy-action and setup-trivy GitHub Actions. Trivy is Aqua Security’s widely used open-source vulnerability scanner, and it runs inside a great many CI/CD pipelines. Compromised images also appeared on Docker Hub. Any pipeline that pulled the affected versions during the exposure window could have had secrets stolen from its runner environment: cloud credentials, tokens, SSH keys. The incident is tracked as CVE-2026-33634.
According to the write-ups from Aqua and others, the root cause goes back to an earlier compromise in late February, when an automated bot abused a misconfigured GitHub Actions workflow to steal a privileged token. Aqua disclosed that incident and rotated credentials on 1 March, but the rotation wasn’t complete, and the attackers kept enough access to come back.
Why This One Stings
Scanners run with privilege by design. They need to see your code, your images and often your registries. They’re also tools we trust, because they’re there to make us safer. That trust is exactly what makes them a high-value target.
It’s the latest in a series I keep writing about: xz (a trusted maintainer), Bybit (a trusted developer machine), and now a trusted security tool.
What I’d Do
- Pin GitHub Actions to a full commit SHA, not a version tag. Tags can be moved, and this attack moved them.
- If you ran an affected version, rotate every secret that pipeline could see. Assume it was taken.
- Give CI jobs the least privilege possible. Use short-lived OIDC credentials instead of long-lived keys, and scope tokens to one job.
- Rotate credentials atomically after any incident. Revoke the old ones at the same moment you issue new ones. A gap is an open door.
- Watch outbound traffic from runners. A build job has no business talking to unknown hosts.
