Security

Rapid Reset – When Hanging Up Is the Attack

On 10 October Cloudflare, Google and AWS jointly disclosed a denial-of-service technique against the HTTP/2 protocol itself, now tracked as CVE-2023-44487 and nicknamed Rapid Reset. It isn’t a bug in one product. It’s a weakness in how HTTP/2 lets a client cancel streams, so nearly every HTTP/2 server, proxy and load balancer was affected to some degree.

What Is It?

HTTP/2 lets a client multiplex many requests (streams) over one connection, and cancel any stream with a reset. Rapid Reset abuses that: open a stream, send the request, cancel it straight away, and repeat as fast as you can. The client never waits for a response, but the server has still done the work of accepting and starting each request. The concurrent-stream limit doesn’t help, because each cancelled stream frees up a slot for the next.

The providers said attacks using the technique were seen in the wild from late August, and they peaked at hundreds of millions of requests per second. That’s record-breaking, and it was done with a surprisingly modest botnet.

As an interesting aside, this is a good example of a protocol “efficiency” feature becoming an attack surface. The feature works exactly as designed. The design just never imagined someone using it this way.

What Should You Do?

  • Find everything in your estate that terminates HTTP/2. That means the obvious web servers, plus load balancers, ingress controllers, API gateways, service meshes and the odd appliance nobody remembers buying.
  • Apply your vendor’s patches or mitigations. Most fixes add limits on how often a client may reset streams before the connection is closed.
  • If you sit behind a CDN or cloud load balancer, check what the provider has already mitigated, and what is still your responsibility further back.

Affected Software

Almost everything that speaks HTTP/2. CISA’s alert links vendor advisories for NGINX, Microsoft, AWS, Google and others, and Red Hat has a good product-by-product bulletin.

More Information

This isn’t an exhaustive list, but hopefully a useful reference! If you’ve been following along, it’s a nice companion to last year’s OpenSSL advisories post.