Today, 17 January 2025, the EU’s Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) applies. The regulation entered into force two years ago. As of today there’s no transition period left: banks, insurers, investment firms, payment providers, crypto-asset service providers and others have to comply now. So do the critical ICT providers that serve them.
The Five Pillars
DORA is organised around five areas:
- ICT risk management. A documented framework, owned by the management body.
- Incident management and reporting. Classifying ICT incidents and reporting major ones to regulators within set timeframes.
- Digital operational resilience testing. Including threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) for the most significant firms.
- ICT third-party risk. Contracts, a register of information, exit strategies, and oversight of critical providers.
- Information sharing. Voluntary exchange of threat intelligence between firms.
Here in Ireland, firms are preparing their register of information for the Central Bank in the spring.
Why I’m Quietly Pleased
I’ve spent much of my career with financial services customers, and I’ve sat on plenty of incident bridges where the honest answer to “what depends on this?” was “we’re not sure”. DORA makes that answer unacceptable. That’s a good thing.
The parts I think matter most from an SRE point of view:
- Testing has to be real. A recovery plan nobody has run is a hypothesis. DORA expects evidence.
- Third-party risk is your risk. Last year gave us Change Healthcare, CDK Global and CrowdStrike. Each time, an outage at a supplier became an outage for many of its customers.
- Incident classification needs to be fast. If it takes four hours to agree whether something is “major”, you’re already late.
If you read my NIS2 post in October, this is the financial-sector companion. DORA takes precedence over NIS2 for the entities it covers.
